Abstract. Recently, a few chosen-ciphertext secure (CCA2-secure) variants of the McEliece public-key encryption (PKE) scheme in the standard model were introduced. All the proposed schemes are based on encryption repetition paradigm and use general transformation from CPAsecure scheme to a CCA2-secure one. Therefore, the resulting encryption scheme needs separate encryption and has large key size compared to the original scheme, which complex public key size problem in the code-based PKE schemes. Thus, the proposed schemes are not sufficiently efficient to be used in practice. In this work, we propose an efficient CCA2-secure variant of the McEliece PKE scheme in the standard model. The main novelty is that, unlike previous approaches, our approach is a generic conversion and can be applied to any one-way trapdoor function (OW-TDF), the lowest-level security notion in the context of public-key cryptography, resolving a big fundamental and central problem that has remained unsolved in the past two decades.
Introduction
Post-quantum cryptography has obtained great attention in recent years. Codebased cryptography holds a great promise for the post-quantum cryptography, as it enjoys very strong security proofs based on average-case hardness [22] , relatively fast and efficient encryption/decryption nature, as well as great simplicity. In the context of code-based cryptography, there are two well-known public-key encryption (PKE) schemes, namely McEliece [13] and Niederreiter [15] PKE schemes. The McEliece encryption scheme was the first PKE scheme based on linear error-correcting codes. It has a very fast and efficient encryption procedure, but it has one big flaw: the size of the public key. Recently, how to reduce the public key size and how to secure the parameter choice in the code-based cryptography are deeply explored [1, 2, 3, 9, 14] .
Semantic security (a.k.a indistinguishability) against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA2 security) is one of the strongest known notions of security for the PKE schemes was introduced by Rackoff and Simon [20] . It is possible to produce CCA2-secure variants of the code-based PKE schemes in the random oracle model [4, 11, 12] , however, CCA2 security in the standard model has not been widely discussed. To the best of our knowledge, only a few papers have touched this research issue.
Related work
There are mainly two class of CCA2-secure code-based PKE schemes in the standard model.
-CCA-secure schemes based on syndrome decoding problem. Freeman et al.
[10] used Rosen-Segev approach [21] to introduce a correlation-secure trapdoor function related to the hardness of syndrome decoding. Their construction is based on the Niederreiter PKE scheme. Very recently, Preetha Mathew et al. [19] proposed a somewhat efficient variant of the Niederreiter scheme based on lossy trapdoor functions [17] , which avoids encryption repetition paradigm. -CCA-secure schemes based on general decoding problem. The first CCA2-secure variants of the McEliece cryptosystem was introduced by Dowsley et al. [5] . They proposed a scheme that resembles the Rosen-Segev approach trying to apply it to the McEliece PKE scheme. Their construction has some ambiguity. The scheme does not rely on a collection of functions but instead defines a structure called k-repetition PKE scheme. This is essentially an application of k-samples of the PKE to the same input, in which the decryption algorithm also includes a verification step on the k outputs. The encryption algorithm produces a signature directly on the McEliece ciphertexts instead of introducing a random vector x as in the original Rosen-Segev scheme; therefore a CPA-secure variant of the McEliece cryptosystem is necessary to achieve CCA2 security [18] . Very recently, Döttling et al. [6] showed that Nojima et al. [16] randomized version of the McEliece cryptosystem is k-repetitions CPA-secure and, as we mentioned earlier, it can obtain CCA2 security by using a strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme. In a subsequent work, Persichetti [18] proposed a CCA2-secure PKE scheme based on the McEliece assumptions using the original Rosen-Segev approach.
Motivation
To date, as we stated above, all the proposed CCA2-secure code-based PKE schemes in the standard model are based on either lossy and correlation-secure trapdoor functions or k-repetitions encryption paradigm. Therefore, the resulting encryption schemes are not efficient as they need to run encryption/decryption algorithms several times and use a strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme to handle CCA2 security related issues. Moreover, in these schemes, excluding the keys of the signature scheme, the public/secret keys are 2k-times larger than the public/secret keys of the original scheme, which complex the public key length problem in the code-based PKE schemes. Although the Preetha Mathew et al.'s scheme [19] avoids k-repetitions paradigm, it yet needs to run encryption/decryption algorithms 2-times and the public/secret keys are larger than the original Niederreiter scheme. Further, it also uses a strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme to achieve CCA2 security, and so needs separate encryption. Hence, how to design an efficient CCA2-secure code-based encryption scheme in the standard model is still worth of investigation. This motivates us to investigate new approach for construction efficient such schemes in the standard model without using encryption repetition and generic transformation from CPA-secure schemes to a CCA2-secure one.
Our Contributions
To tackle the above challenging issues, we introduce a randomized encoding algorithm called PCA and use it along with the McEliece PKE scheme to construct a CCA2-secure PKE scheme in the standard model. Our contributions in this paper are:
-The main novelty is that our construction is a generic conversion and can be applied to any low-level primitive. To further demonstrate the usefulness of our approach, in Section 4 we also introduce direct "black-box" construction of a CCA2-secure PKE scheme from any TDF in the standard model, resolving a big fundamental and central problem in the context of public-key cryptography that has remained unsolved in the past two decades. -Our proposed scheme is more efficient, the publick/secret keys are as in the original scheme and the encryption/decryption complexity are comparable to the original scheme. -This novel approach leads to the elimination of the encryption repetition and using strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme. -This scheme can be used for encryption of long length messages without employing the hybrid encryption method and symmetric encryption.
Organisation. In the next section, we briefly explain some mathematical background and definitions. Then, in Section 3, we introduce our proposed scheme. Finally, a generalized construction based on OW-TDFs will be given in Section 4.
Preliminary

Notation
We represent a binary string in general by bold face letter such as x = (x 1 , . . . x n ). Regular small font letter x denotes its corresponding decimal value, that is x = n i=1 x i 2 (n−i) and |x| denotes its binary length. If k ∈ N then {0, 1} k denote the set of k-bit strings, 1 k denote a string of k ones and {0, 1} * denote the set of bit strings of finite length. y ← x denotes the assignment to y of the value x. For a set S, s ← S denote the assignment to s of a uniformly random element of S. For a deterministic algorithm A, we write x ← A O (y, z) to mean that x is assigned the output of running A on inputs y and z, with access to oracle O. If A is a probabilistic algorithm, we may write x ← A O (y, z, R) to mean the output of A when run on inputs y and z with oracle access to O and using the random coins R. We denote by Pr[E] the probability that the event E occurs. If a and b are two strings of bits, we denote by a b their concatenation. Lsb x1 (a) means the right x 1 bits of a and Msb x2 (a) means the left x 2 bits of a.
Since the proposed cryptosystem is code-based, a few notations regarding coding theory are introduced. Let F 2 be the finite field with 2 elements {0, 1}, k ∈ N be a security parameter. A binary linear-error correcting code C of length n and dimension k or an [n, k]-code is a k-dimensional subspace of F 2 ⌋, the code is said to be t-error correcting if it detects and corrects errors of weight at most t. Hence, the code can also be represented as a [n, k, 2t + 1] code. The generator matrix G ∈ F k×n 2 of a [n, k] linear code C is a matrix of rank k whose rows span the code C.
Definitions Definition 1 (Trapdoor functions) A trapdoor function family is a triple of algorithms
, where Tdg is probabilistic and on input 1
Definition 2 (One-wayness) Let A be an inverter and define its OWadvantage against TDF as
Trapdoor function TDF is one-way if Adv ow TDF,A (k) is negligible for every PPT inverter A.
Definition 3 (Circular Shift) A circular (cyclic) shift is the operation of rearranging the components in a string circularly with a prescribed number of positions.
Thus, a q-position circular shift (or circular q-shift) defines as the operation in which the i-th sample, s i , replace with the (i + q mod n)-th sample in a n sample ensemble. We denote this operation by CS q,n (s i ) = s (i+q mod n) , 
We define the corresponding success probability of A in solving the GDP problem via
Let τ ∈ N and ε ∈ [0, 1]. We call GDP to be (τ, ε)-secure if no polynomial algorithm A running in time τ has success Succ GDP A ≥ ε.
Definition 6 (Public-key encryption) A public-key encryption (PKE) scheme is a triple of probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithms
-Gen is a probabilistic polynomial time key generation algorithm which takes a security parameter 1 n as input and outputs a public key pk and a secret-key sk. We write (pk, sk) ← Gen(1 n ). The public key specifies the message space M and the ciphertext space C.
-Enc is a (possibly) probabilistic polynomial time encryption algorithm which takes as input a public key pk, a m ∈ M and random coins r, and outputs a ciphertext C ∈ C. We write Enc(pk, m; r) to indicate explicitly that the random coins r is used and Enc(pk, m) if fresh random coins are used. -Dec is a deterministic polynomial time decryption algorithm which takes as input a secret-key sk and a ciphertext C ∈ C, and outputs either a message m ∈ M or an error symbol ⊥. We write m ← Dec(C, sk). -(Completeness) For any pair of public and secret-keys generated by Gen and any message m ∈ M it holds that Dec(sk, Enc(pk, m; r)) = m with overwhelming probability over the randomness used by Gen and the random coins r used by Enc. 
The McEliece PKE scheme
The McEliece PKE consists of a triplet of probabilistic polynomial time algo-
-System parameters. q, n, t ∈ N, where t ≪ n.
-Key Generation. Gen McE take as input security parameter 1 k and generate the following matrices:
1. A k × n generator matrix G of a code G over F q of dimension k and minimum distance d ≥ 2t + 1. (A binary irreducible Goppa code in the original proposal). 2. A k × k random binary non-singular matrix S 3. A n × n random permutation matrix P. Then, Gen compute the k × n matrix G pub = SGP and outputs a public key pk and a secret key sk, where
where D G is an efficient decoding algorithm for G. Otherwise, output ⊥. 
The proposed cryptosystem
In this section, we introduce our conversion. Our construction consists of two parts: 1) Encryption of random coins r using the original McEliece PKE scheme; 2) Randomized encoding of the plaintext, where randomization is done using r (that used for consistency check) based on a heuristic encoding algorithm. Encoding includes a permutation and combination on the message bits that performs using an algorithm called permutation combination algorithm (PCA).
PCA encoding algorithm
To encode message m ∈ {0, 1} n with n ≫ k, we firstly pick coins r ∈ {0, 1} k , r = 0 k , 1 k uniformly at random, where k is the security parameter. Let wt(r) = h be its Hamming weight. We divide m into l blocks (b 1 . . . b l ) with equal binary length ⌈n/l⌉, where l = h if h ≥ k − h, else l = k − h. If l ∤ n, then we should pad m. In such cases, we can sample a random binary string (RBS) from r, say RBS = Msb l⌈n/l⌉−n (r), and pad it on the right of m 2 . Therefore, if l | n then v = n/l, RBS = ϕ (the empty set) and b l = Lsb v (m), else v = ⌈n/l⌉, RBS is a random string with length l ⌈n/l⌉ − n which sampled from r and d l = Lsb (n−(l−1)⌈n/l⌉) (m) RBS. Now, we perform a secure permutation on the message blocks b i , 1 ≤ i ≤ l with the following algorithm.
First, note that any positive integer s, 1 ≤ s ≤ l! − 1 uniquely can be shown as
Note that based on this definition we have u l = 0. The sequence U s = (u 1 , . . . , u l ) is called factorial carry value of s. We define original sequence m 0 as m 0 = (b 1 . . . b l ). Recombine all elements of the original sequence m 0 obtain l!−1 new sequences m 1 , . . . , m (l!−1) , which any sequence owns a corresponding factorial carry value. Using the factorial carry value of s, we can efficiently obtain any sequence m s , 1 ≤ s ≤ l! − 1 with the following algorithm.
Algorithm 1 (PCA encoding algorithm)
Input: Message m ∈ {0, 1} n , coins r ∈ {0, 1} k and integer s, 1 ≤ s ≤ l! − 1.
Setup: 
Permutation:
Write s as s
Note that the number and the length of the message blocks are variable and changed by r. It is clear that the above encoding algorithm satisfies correctness. Namely, for any (m, r) we have ∀m ∈ {0, 1} n , r ∈ {0, 1} k and s ∈ N : PCA −1 (PCA(m, r, s), r, s) = m.
We illustrate PCA encoding algorithm with a small example. Suppose m = (m 1 , . . . , m 512 ) and r = (r 1 , . . . , r 25 ) with h = 25 i=1 r i = 12. Since 2h < k, thus l = k − h = 13. Therefore, the algorithm divides m into 13 blocks with equal length v = ⌈n/l⌉ = ⌈512/13⌉ = 40. In this case, we have to sample a string with length l⌈n/l⌉ − n = 8 from r and pad it on the right of m. Therefore, we have 
The proposed scheme
Now, we are ready to define our conversion. Given a McEliece PKE scheme Π = (Gen McE , Enc McE , Dec McE ), we transform it into CCA2-secure PKE scheme Π ′ = (Gen cca2 , Enc cca2 , Dec cca2 ).
Key Generation. On security parameter k,
and pk McE = (G pub , t) as in subsection 2.3. It also choose target collision resistant (aka universal one-way) hash function T : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} k and pseudorandom generator G : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} n . pk = {(S, D G , P), G, T} is the public key and sk = {(G pub , t), G, T} is the secret key.
Encryption. To create ciphertext, encryption algorithm in some cases performs operations in decimal, and in other cases it performs operations in binary representation of the components. When we do operations in decimal, we show components by regular small fonts, and when we perform operations in binary, we show components by bold face fonts. To encrypt message m ∈ {0, 1}
and u l = 0, and run PCA encoding algorithm (Algorithm 1) on inputs (m, r, s) to generate encoded message y ′ = PCA(m, r, s). Note that we have U s = (u 1 , . . . , u l−1 , 0) . 5. Perform a circular q-shift on the encoded message y ′ and compute sequence y = CS q,|y ′ | (y ′ ), where q = r mod n. Note n and so q < |y ′ |. 6. Compute
where r, y are the corresponding decimal value of r and y.r is the decimal value of the complement of r and z = l−1 i=1 u i . As we know, in hybrid PKE schemes XOR alone cannot perfectly hide challenge bit to the CCA2 adversary. To handle CCA2 security related issues, we increase obfuscation of the XORed message by a) perform a randomized encoding on its bits and b) perform a secure circular shift on the bits of encoded message, whose shift step depends on the value of r. Moreover, we disguise encoded message and conceal its bits by setting C 1 = (hy +r)r + z in order to decrease malleability of the ciphertext. (See Proposition 1) . Therefore, the CCA2 adversary to extract any useful information about challenge bit from C 1 must first recover the same coins r that was used to create the ciphertext from the McEliece PKE scheme, which is impossible if the McEliece PKE scheme be secure.
Decryption. To recover message m from C = (C 1 , C 2 ), Dec cca2 perform the following steps. 
holds 3 and reject if not (consistency check). If it holds compute wt(r) = h.
3 In deterministic code-based PKE schemes such as Niederreiter PKE scheme, we don't need to perform this checking. In these schemes since encryption algorithm is deterministic, each message has one pre-image. Therefore if C2 = C * 2 , then r = Dec(C2, sk) = Dec(C * 2 , sk) = r * . But in the McEliece encryption scheme, for i-th and j-th unit vectors ei and ej (with i = j) if wt(e, ei) = 1 and wt(e, ej ) = 0, then C ′ 2 = (rG pub ⊕ e) ⊕ ei ⊕ ej is a correct ciphertext, since the Hamming weight of e ⊕ ei ⊕ ej is t. Therefore, queried ciphertext of the form (C1, C2 ⊕ ei ⊕ ej) may leaks information of the original message. Thus, we need to check well-formedness of the ciphertext and reject such maliciously-formed one.
Compute
and reject if y is not a (l⌈n/l⌉)-bit integer (consistency check). Note that if l | n then |y| = n.
Compute y
q,|y| (y), where y is the binary representation of y. q = r mod n and |y ′ | = |y|.
and RBS = Msb l⌈n/l⌉−n (r). Check wether
holds and reject if not (consistency check). If it holds output
else output ⊥.
Remark 1 Note that if either y or r be illegal values, then the decryption algorithm outputs a random string.
Proposition 1 The ciphertext C 1 is non-malleable.
Proof. We say that (Ĉ 1 , C 2 ) is a valid forgery on (C 1 , C 2 ) ifŷ differ from y in some bits, whereŷ and y are the corresponding binary representation of y = ((Ĉ 1 − z)/r −r)/h and y = ((C 1 − z)/r −r)/h respectively. If the adversary can produce suchĈ 1 , then he can guess challenge bit fromm = Msb l⌈n/l⌉−n (m⊕ G(r)). Without loss of generality, we assumeŷ and y differ in i-th bit. Namelŷ y = y⊕e i , where e i is the i-th unit vector. Thus, we should haveŷ = y ±2 i . That is,Ĉ 1 = (hŷ +r)r + z = C 1 ± 2 i hr. Since secret coins r ∈ {0, 1} k is not known to the adversary, thus the probability that the adversary produces a valid forgery on C 1 is negligible and it is 2 −k . This is because in the encryption algorithm we set C 1 = (hy +r)r + z. Proof. The encryption algorithm uses coins r to encrypt challenge message. In the encryption algorithm, we do not use any cryptographic primitives to be able to reduce CCA security of the proposed PKE scheme to the hardness or security of them. Note that we only use the McEliece PKE scheme to encrypt the coins r and encryption of the challenge message independent of its output. In the proof of security, we exploit the fact that for a given ciphertext, we can recover the message if we know the same encoded message y and randomness r that was used to create the ciphertext. We stress that if either y or r is not legal values, then the output of the decryption algorithm is random. Thus, the challenge bit is information-theoretically hidden to the CCA2 adversary, and so, his advantage in guessing challenge bit is 0.
Let C * = (C * 1 , C * 2 ) be the challenge ciphertext, where C * 1 = (h * y * +r * )r * +z * and y * = PCA(m b ⊕ G(r * ), r * ). Denote the secret randomness used to encrypt m b by r * . Assume towards contradiction that there is an efficient adversary A breaking CCA2 security of the proposed PKE scheme with non-negligible probability. That is, the adversary A can guess challenge bit with nonnegligible probability at least from one of the below cases. Since a decryption query on the challenge ciphertext is forbidden by the CCA2-experiment, thus if C 1 = C * 1 , then C 2 = C * 2 and vice versa. Therefore, there are three possible cases:
. In this case, the decryption oracle takes as input (C 1 , C 2 ) and compute r = Dec McE (C 2 ) ∈ {0, 1}
k . If r = r * while C 2 = C * 2 , then the decryption oracle will reject in (2) . It also computes l,
In the worst case, we assume y = ((C 1 − z)/r −r)/h is a (n + l⌈n/l⌉ − n)-bit integer. That is, there is an integer y such that C 1 = (hy +r)r + z. The decryption oracle computes y ′ = CS −1 r mod n,|y| (y) and decodes y ′ based on recovered coins r and computed value s. We havem = PCA −1 (y ′ , r, s) = PCA −1 (y ′ * , r * , s * ) =m * , even we assume y ′ = y ′ * . If we also assume condition (6) holds (i.e., Lsb l⌈n/l⌉−n (m ⊕ G(r)) = Msb l⌈n/l⌉−n (r)), then the decryption oracle outputs random string m = Msb l⌈n/l⌉−n (m ⊕ G(r)) in (7) . Since m is a random string, thus challenge bit is information-theoretically hidden to the CCA2 adversary, and so, his advantage to guess challenge bit is 0.
Case2. C = (C * 1 , C 2 = C * 2 ). In this case, the decryption oracle takes as input (C * 1 , C 2 ) and compute r = Dec McE (C 2 ). If r = r * while C 2 = C * 2 , then the decryption oracle will reject in (2). In the worst case, we assume y = ((C * 1 − z)/r −r)/h is a (n + l⌈n/l⌉ − n)-bit integer and y ′ = CS −1 r mod n,|y| (y) = y ′ * . Since r is illegal, i.e. r = r * (and so s = s * ),
If we also assume condition (6) is hold, then the decryption algorithm outputs random string m = Msb l⌈n/l⌉−n (m ⊕ G(r)) in (7). Therefore, challenge bit is informationtheoretically hidden to the CCA2 adversary, and so, his advantage to guess challenge bit is 0.
. In this case, the decryption oracle takes as input (C 1 , C * 2 ) and compute r = Dec McE (C * 2 ) = r * . It also computes y = ((C 1 − z * )/r * −r * )/h * = y * 4 . In the worst case, we assume y is an integer. We consider tree possible cases for y: 4 In this case we have y = y * . If y = y * , then we have C1 = (h * y +r * )r * + z * = (h * y * +r * )r * + z * = C a) y is a multiple of y * . That is, for any k ∈ N, k = 1 we have y = ky * . In this case |y| = |k||y * | = |y * | = n + l⌈n/l⌉ − n and the decryption oracle reject in (3). b) |y| = |y * |, and, y and y * are differ from each other only in some bits. In this case, y ′ = CS −1 q * ,|y| (y) and y ′ * = CS −1 q * ,|y| (y) are also differ from each other only in some bits. Therefore, the CCA2 adversary can guess challenge bit from m ′ = PCA −1 (y ′ , r * , s * ) ⊕ G(r * ). Without loss of generality, we can assume y = y * ⊕e i , where e i is the i-th unit vector. Thus we have y = y * ±2 i , where y and y * are the corresponding decimal value of y and y * . Therefore, we should have C 1 = (y * h * +r * )r * + z * ± 2 i h * r * = C * 1 ± 2 i h * r * . Since secret coins r * ∈ {0, 1} k is not known to the CCA2 adversary, thus the probability that CCA2 adversary produce a forgery on C 1 is negligible and it is 2 −k . Therefore, the CCA2 adversary's advantage in this case is negligible (see also Proposition1). c) |y| = |y * |, and, y = y * (and so y ′ = CS −1 q * ,|y| (y)) is a random string. In this case m ′ = PCA −1 (y ′ , r * , s * ) ⊕ G(r * ) also is a random string and the decryption oracle outputs random string Msb l⌈n/l⌉−n (m ′ ). Thus, challenge bit is information-theoretically hidden to the CCA2 adversary, and so, his advantage to guess challenge bit is 0.
From Case1, Case2 and Case3, the CCA2 adversary advantage to guess challenge bit is negligible. This contradicts the assumption that the CCA2 adversary can break CCA2 security of the proposed PKE scheme with non-negligible probability.
Performance analysis
The performance-related issues can be discussed with respect to the computational complexity of key generation, key sizes, encryption and decryption speed. 
else output ⊥. 
